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Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
Does Not Call for Universal Injunctions or Other 
Universal Remedies  
John Harrison* 
In Trump v. Pennsylvania,1 the Supreme Court faces the question 
whether the Administrative Procedure Act’s provision governing scope 
of judicial review instructs courts to give universal injunctions—
injunctions telling the government not to apply a challenged agency ac-
tion to anyone, not just the plaintiff.  That provision, section 706 of title 5 
of the United States Code, does not direct courts to give universal reme-
dies.  It does not address remedies at all.  When it says that the reviewing 
court shall “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that fails the tests 
it sets out, section 706 means that courts are not to follow the agency ac-
tion in deciding the case.2  The APA addresses remedies, not in section 
706, but in section 703.  Section 703 in turn points to the remedies law as-
sociated with the forms of proceeding for judicial review that it identifies. 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the debate about universal 
remedies.  Part II elaborates the concept of universal remedies.  That cat-
egory includes but is not limited to universal injunctions like the injunc-
tions given by the trial courts in Trump v. Pennsylvania and the travel 
ban case, Trump v. Hawaii.3  Part II also discusses the principal constitu-
tional objection to universal remedies and the main response to that ob-
jection.  Part III explores the text and structure of the APA, showing that 
section 706 does not address remedies, and that if it did, it would not au-
thorize universal injunctions.4 
I.  The Controversy over Universal Remedies 
The past few years have seen debate, in the courts and the academy, 
about remedies against the government that constrain its treatment of 
persons who are not parties to the case.  In several high-profile cases, dis-
trict courts ordered the government not to enforce a challenged policy 
                                                   
* James Madison Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.  Thanks to Sam 
Bray for comments. 
1 No. 19-454 (2020). 
2 “The reviewing court shall— (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be” inconsistent with several tests set out, including the requirement that agency action not be 
arbitrary or capricious.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
3 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
4 The reading of section 706 set forth here has important implications for the practice called re-
manding without vacating.  See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silber-
man, J., and Randolph, J., differing on propriety of remanding action to an agency without vacat-
ing the agency’s decision).  I will not explore those implications here, other than to say that 
although section 706 does not support either of the main contending positions on that issue, it 
gives more support to the opponents than to the proponents of remand without vacatur. 
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against anyone, whether or not a party.5  Professor Samuel Bray explored 
the issue in depth and criticized the practice.6   
 When one of the orders that forbade enforcement as to any party 
came before the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court reversed 
on the merits and did not address the proper breadth of the remedy.  Jus-
tice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, argued that “universal injunctions 
are legally and historically dubious.  If federal courts continue to issue 
them, this Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so.”7  
The academic debate continues.8   
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Trump v. Pennsyl-
vania, in which the district court issued, and the Third Circuit affirmed, 
an injunction directing the government not to enforce the regulations at 
issue as to anyone.  The government’s certiorari petition objected to the 
sweep of the injunction.9  That objection is part of a policy of resisting 
such decrees.  In 2018, Attorney General Sessions issued guidelines to all 
Department of Justice litigators for cases involving nationwide injunc-
tions.10  The guidelines hold that “Universal Vacatur Is Not Contemplat-
ed by the APA.”11 
II.  Universal Injunctions, Universal Remedies, and the APA 
This Part will elaborate the concept of universal remedies against the 
government, explain how universal remedies fit into the proceedings for 
judicial review referred to by section 703 of the APA, and describe the 
principal constitutional problem that such remedies raise  
Trump v. Hawaii and Trump v. Pennsylvania involve judicial reme-
dies now often called “universal injunctions.”  A universal injunction di-
rects the government as defendant not to engage in some conduct, like 
enforcing a regulation, as to anyone.  The district court in the travel ban 
                                                   
5 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015) (approving nationwide 
injunctions against enforcement of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Per-
manent Residents program), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
6 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 417 (2017).  
7 See 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas relied on Professor 
Bray’s work. See id. at 2427. 
8 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 
(2020) (noting that universal injunctions were well known before the APA). 
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 32-35, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454 (2020). 
10 See Memorandum from the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Litigation Guide-
lines for Cases Presenting the Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018).  The guide-
lines do not take the position I do, that section 706 does not concern remedies at all.  Instead, the 
guidelines say that courts should confine themselves to invalidating the concrete agency action 
before them.  The concrete action may be, not a regulation, but the application of the regulation 
to the private party’s conduct.  If the agency action before the court is a rule itself, and not just 
its application to the private party, the court should set it aside only as applied, and not on its 
face.  Id. at 7. 
11 Id. 
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case ordered the government not to apply the ban to anyone.  In Trump 
v. Pennsylvania, the district court ordered the defendant agencies not to 
enforce the challenged regulation against anyone.  The injunctions in 
both cases were universal in that they applied to all possible objects of the 
government decision at issue.  For that reason, they involved the govern-
ment’s conduct with respect to many non-parties.  In the travel ban case, 
the ban did not apply at all to Hawaii, which is already in the United 
States. 
Universal injunctions are instances of the broader category of uni-
versal remedies.  Another kind of universal remedy is deployed under a 
type of statute that is quite familiar in administrative law.  Some statutes 
that provide for judicial review of agency action put the reviewing court 
in a position very similar to that of an appellate court.  An appellate 
court’s judgment operates directly on the legal effect of the lower court’s 
judgment.  For that reason, appellate review is called direct, as opposed 
to collateral, review.  If an appellate court reverses the lower court, that 
act by itself eliminates the legal effect of the judgment being reversed, 
which otherwise would remain in operation.   
When a statute creates that kind of judicial review of agency adjudi-
cation, any decree of the reviewing court is limited to the parties to the 
adjudication.  Some statutes, however, create the appellate-review struc-
ture for agency regulations, which like laws usually apply to many people.  
If the statute authorizes the reviewing court to take the kind of step with 
respect to a regulation that an appellate court takes with respect to a low-
er-court judgment, overturning it entirely, the statute provides for a kind 
of universal remedy.  The statutory provision for review of SEC rules, for 
example, authorizes the court to “set aside” the rule under review.12  If 
setting aside a rule works like setting aside a lower-court judgment, and 
deprives the action set aside of any legal effect, that provision enables 
courts to free all parties subject to a rule of obligations under it.13  That is 
a universal remedy.  It is not a universal injunction, because it is not an 
order to the agency. 
The APA has a place for both kinds of universal remedy, if they are 
available in the applicable form of judicial review, and it is important to 
see that the statute distinguishes between them.  Section 703 of title 5 
provides: 
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review 
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, 
in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, 
including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or 
                                                   
12 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b) (2018). 
13 I have not studied the SEC statute carefully enough to know whether it does enable the re-
viewing court to nullify an agency rule altogether.  That some statutes work that way is a premise 
of many judicial decisions and much scholarship.  I assume that some do, and give section 78y(b) 
as a possible example. 
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mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. . . . Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive oppor-
tunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to ju-
dicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.14   
Section 78y of title 15 is a special review statute for the SEC.  The Hobbs 
Act is a special review statute for several agencies, including the FCC.15 
Injunctions against enforcement, like those at issue in Trump v. Ha-
waii and Trump v. Pennsylvania, are an applicable form of legal action 
other than a special review statute.  Injunctive proceedings are structured 
like lawsuits against the government, not like appeals from a lower tribu-
nal.  An injunction against proceedings to enforce a regulation is an order 
to the government.  It does not purport to undo the regulation the way 
the agency might revoke it.  Although injunctions against enforcement 
and decrees reversing or setting aside agency action under special review 
statutes are distinct, both can constitute universal remedies.  If a court 
under a special review statute sets aside a regulation that applies to par-
ties other than the party seeking review, it gives a universal remedy.  If 
the court in an injunctive proceeding tells the government not to enforce 
a rule against anyone, it gives a universal remedy.  
The primary constitutional objection to universal remedies has main-
ly been discussed with respect to universal injunctions, but it can apply to 
the broader category.  The objection is that universal remedies can go be-
yond vindicating the rights of the plaintiff, and so go beyond the Article 
III case or controversy the plaintiff has presented and that the court has 
power to decide.   A central aspect of the debate over universal remedies 
turns on the possibility that only some of them raise that problem.   
The first step in understanding the objection and its limits is to see 
how a court might give an order that remedies the harm to the plaintiff, 
although the order concerns the government’s treatment of some third 
party.  An example is Pierce v. Society of Sisters.16  That case involved an 
Oregon statute that required that parents send their children to public 
schools.  The Society of Sisters operated a private school.  The statute did 
not apply to the Society, but to its potential contracting partners.  The 
Court found that the Society’s economic interest made it a proper plain-
tiff to seek an injunction against enforcement of the law as to parents, 
who were not parties.17  The Court found that the statute’s restriction on 
                                                   
14 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018).  Provisions of title 5 that derive from the APA are often referred to by 
the name of that statute, so section 703 is often called section 703 of the APA.  That usage is not 
strictly correct, because title 5 replaced the APA as originally enacted, but it is common and well 
understood. 
15 The Hobbs Act gives the reviewing court exclusive jurisdiction “to enjoin, set aside, suspend 
(in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of” the agency actions it refers to.  28 U.S.C. § 
2342 (2018). 
16 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  
17 Id. at 535. 
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parents was unconstitutional, and approved an injunction entered by the 
lower court that prohibited enforcement against parents.  Relief to the 
plaintiff ran through non-parties, but was justified by its benefits to the 
plaintiff. 
The next step to a justification for universal orders is the possibility 
that the court might not be able to identify the specific third parties 
through whom harm to the plaintiff would come.  In the travel ban case, 
Hawaii argued that the ban harmed it economically by keeping people 
from coming to the State, and that identifying potential visitors to Hawaii 
among all the people subject to the ban was not feasible.  The only way to 
make sure to give Hawaii a remedy was to bar enforcement of the ban as 
to anyone.18  With that argument, the State sought to fit its case into a 
category familiar from equity: indivisible relief.  When relief cannot be 
divided so as to affect only the plaintiff, equity principles often allow ef-
fects on third parties in the interest of a remedy for the plaintiff.  The 
source of indivisibility can be difficulty in administering a more fine-
grained decree, as in the travel ban case.  The source can also come from 
the physical effects of the defendant’s conduct.  If one neighbor claims 
that another’s loud noise at night is a nuisance, an injunction against mak-
ing the noise will affect all neighbors within earshot, not just the plaintiff. 
Special review statutes raise the same constitutional issues insofar as 
they provide for universal remedies.  A special review statute that ena-
bles a court to annul regulations altogether is subject to the objection that 
it goes beyond vindicating the rights of the plaintiff.  A possible response 
is that relief to the plaintiff is indivisible from its effects on third parties 
for good practical reasons.  I will not explore this important question fur-
ther, because the main point of this article is that section 706 of the APA 
does not raise it.  Section 706 does not call for universal remedies. 
Universal remedies raise a problem under Article III when they take 
the courts beyond vindicating the rights of the parties before them.  Justi-
fying a universal remedy by its benefits to the plaintiff is an answer to 
that problem.  That answer may not be adequate, and it will not be avail-
able in every case.  If Congress has called for universal remedies, then the 
constitutional problem and possible responses to it must be addressed.  
The view that Congress has done so in section 706 appears to be wide-
spread.  Congress has not done so. 
III. Section 706 and Universal Remedies 
The argument that the APA calls for universal remedies in all cases 
involving judicial review of regulations may seem quite natural after the 
discussion of special review statutes that put the judiciary in a position 
                                                   
18 See Brief for Respondent at 77, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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like that of an appellate tribunal.  That argument goes as follows:  Some 
special review statutes contemplate that the court may “set aside” the 
agency action under review.  When an appellate tribunal sets aside a low-
er tribunal’s judgment, it renders that judgment inoperative.  When a 
special review statute contemplates that the reviewing court will set aside 
a regulation, as opposed to an adjudication, it may contemplate one of 
the forms of universal relief discussed above: by setting aside the regula-
tion, the court eliminates its effects as to everyone, plaintiff and non-
parties alike.  Section 706 tells courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” 
agency action that fails one of the tests it sets out.  Therefore, when the 
agency action under review is a regulation and the regulation is unlawful, 
section 706 instructs the reviewing court to make the regulation legally 
null.  Because section 706 applies to all judicial review, its command to 
set aside agency action is not confined to special review statutes, and ap-
plies in cases like Trump v. Pennsylvania, which involves an injunction 
and not a special review statute. 
Section 706 does not tell courts to apply the remedy of setting aside 
agency action.  It does not deal with remedial orders at all.  When it says 
“set aside,” it directs the court not to decide in accordance with the agen-
cy action.  The remedial consequences of so treating an agency action de-
pend on the form of proceeding, and so are governed by section 703 and 
the sources of law to which it points.  In an enforcement proceeding, for 
example, to set the agency action aside is to treat it as legally ineffective, 
the way a court treats an unconstitutional statute as ineffective. 
If section 706 did instruct courts to set aside agency actions the way 
they do in appellate-type proceedings under special review statutes, it still 
would not justify the kind of universal injunction at issue in Trump v. 
Pennsylvania.  Injunctions are commands to agencies.  They do not di-
rectly affect the legal status of regulations.  
 A. Section 706 Does Not Authorize Remedies 
The argument that section 706 does not concern remedies has two 
components.  The first is about its text, the second about the structure of 
the APA’s judicial review provisions.   
 1.The Different Senses of “Set Aside” 
When the APA was adopted, and today, a court can “set aside” an-
other party’s action in more than one way.  As discussed above, when an 
appellate court reverses or vacates a lower court’s judgment, it can be 
said to set that judgment aside.  The appellate court engages in a juridical 
act that alters the legal consequences of another juridical act.  Lower-
court judgments have binding effect unless disturbed.  Reversal or vaca-
tur eliminates that effect, causing the lower court judgment to be inopera-
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tive.  This is the sense of “set aside” the Third Circuit relied on in Trump 
v. Pennsylvania.19  
Those words can also refer to a court’s decision to regard a purport-
edly valid juridical act as ineffective.  That is what courts do when they 
find a statutory rule to be unconstitutional.  According to the standard 
account of judicial review, the Constitution itself renders lower-level 
rules that conflict with it inoperative.  That invalidity is found by the 
courts, not made.  When a court finds a statutory rule unconstitutional, it 
does not issue an order purporting to reverse or vacate the statute.  In-
stead, the court decides the case on the assumption that the unconstitu-
tional statutory rule is not binding and is to be disregarded.20  Any reme-
dy the court gives runs to the defendant, not to the legislature. 
In the years before the APA was adopted in 1946, courts and Con-
gress sometimes used “set aside” to refer to a judicial finding of invalidi-
ty.  Two well-known cases from the 1930s illustrate judicial usage.  In Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,21 Justice Butler in dissent invoked the “grave 
consequences liable to result from erroneous exertion of [the Court’s] 
power to set aside legislation.”22  Justice Butler referred to a power, but 
he understood that it was exercised by disregarding unconstitutional stat-
utes in the process of deciding cases.  He pointed to the Court’s “reluc-
tance to consider constitutional questions,” as a result of which “legisla-
tion will not be held invalid as repugnant to the fundamental law if the 
case may be decided upon any other ground.”23 He recognized that legis-
lation was held invalid, that is found to be and not made to be invalid, 
and that such holdings were made in order to decide cases, and could be 
avoided if another ground of decision could be found.  Justice Butler 
went on to point to the Court’s practice of making sure to “indicate pre-
cisely the principle or provision of the Constitution held to have been 
transgressed, and fully disclose the reasons and authorities found to war-
rant the conclusion of invalidity.”24  Invalidity was for Justice Butler a 
                                                   
19 See Pennsylvania v. President, 930 F.3d 543, 575 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[O]ur APA case law sug-
gests that, at the merits stage, courts invalidate—without qualification—unlawful administrative 
rules as a matter of course, leaving their predecessors in place until the agencies can take further 
action. Congress determined that rule-vacatur was not unnecessarily burdensome on agencies 
when it provided vacatur as a standard remedy for APA violations.” (citing Prometheus Radio v. 
F.C.C., 652 F.3d 431, 453-54 & n.25 (3d Cir. 2011) (vacating procedurally defective rule and leav-
ing the prior rule in effect); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 258 (3d Cir. 
2010) (same))).  The Court of Appeals may not have noticed the difference between review un-
der special review statutes that put the reviewing court in a position like that of an appellate tri-
bunal, and a suit for an injunction against enforcement.  The cases it cited were of the former 
kind; the case before it was of the latter. 
20 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding statutes that are inconsistent with 
the Constitution are invalid and courts treat them as legally ineffective). 
21 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
22 Id. at 87 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
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conclusion reached on the basis of reasons and authorities, not a change 
in the legal landscape.   
In another momentous case from the 1930s, Home Building & Loan 
v. Blaisdell,25 the Court described an earlier Contracts Clause case as one 
in which “a statute which restricted the power of taxation which had pre-
viously been given to provide for the payment of municipal bonds was set 
aside.”26  Like Justice Butler in Erie, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the 
Court in Blaisdell, had in mind the orthodox approach, in which invalidity 
is found, not made.  In the sentence immediately before his use of “set 
aside,” the Chief Justice described another earlier Contracts Clause case 
as one in which “a state law was found to be invalid.”27 
Congress used “set aside” the same way in a 1937 statute that was 
spurred in large part by cases involving federal agencies.  Congress that 
year did not expand the Supreme Court as President Roosevelt had re-
quested, but it did act to constrain constitutional judicial review.  A 
change to the jurisdictional statutes provided that only three-judge dis-
trict courts were to issue any “interlocutory or permanent injunction re-
straining the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in 
whole or in part, any Act of Congress upon the ground that such Act or 
any part thereof is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.”28  
Congress’s assumption that an injunction can set aside a statute rested on 
the orthodox account of judicial review.  According to that account, 
courts find unconstitutionality and, when appropriate, give remedies like 
injunctions that reflect that finding.  A court that issues an injunction 
based on a finding of invalidity can be said to set aside the relevant stat-
ute, but does not render the statute legally inoperative.  Injunctions are 
orders to defendants.  They can limit the enforcement of statutes, but 
they do not purport to alter the content of statutory law.  An interlocuto-
ry injunction can be dissolved by the court that issued it, and a permanent 
injunction can be reversed by an appellate court.  Courts cannot repeal or 
reenact statutes, but they can make and unmake orders to agencies.  The 
three-judge court statute did not assume that a court can set aside a stat-
ute the way an appellate court sets aside a lower court’s judgment. 
 The attitude of the bill’s sponsors on this point need not be left to in-
ference from the statute they prepared. The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee’s report on the bill had several statements reflecting the orthodox un-
derstanding of judicial review. The most striking is a quotation from an 
opinion by Justice Sutherland that is a classic formulation of the ortho-
doxy: 
                                                   
25 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
26 Id. at 432 (citing Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1867)). 
27 Id. (citing Planters’ Bank of Miss. v. Sharp, 47 U.S. 301 (1848)). 
28 Act of August 24, 1937, ch. 754, sec. 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752. 
Section 706 Does Not Call for Universal Injunctions 
45 
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the 
ground that they are unconstitutional. . . . [T]he power exercised is that of 
ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy.  It 
amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitu-
tional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the enforce-
ment of a legal right.29 
Besides quoting Justice Sutherland, the committee stated that “[n]o 
substantive power exists to review and nullify acts of Congress.”30  For 
the drafters of the 1937 three-judge court statute, “set aside” meant treat 
as non-binding. 
 2.“Set Aside” and the Relationship Between Sections 706 and 703 
When section 706 directs courts to set aside agency action, it thus 
might mean, not to decide in accordance with that action, including re-
garding it as legally ineffective.  The structure of the APA confirms that 
section 706 uses “set aside” that way.  Section 706 governs “scope of re-
view.”  Section 703 governs “form and venue of proceeding for judicial 
review.”  It includes as forms of proceeding for judicial review special re-
view statutes, other forms of action including habeas corpus, declaratory 
and injunctive proceedings, and civil or criminal enforcement proceed-
ings.31   
In several of those forms of proceeding, the court does not issue an 
order that purports to change the legal status of the agency’s action at is-
sue.  When a court in an enforcement proceeding conducts review, finds 
that the agency action was unlawful, and sets it aside, the defendant pre-
vails and the government loses.  The court gives no affirmative remedy 
purporting to set aside the agency action.  Declaratory judgments conclu-
sively determine, but do not change, the parties’ legal relations.  If a court 
sets an agency action aside in the sense of regarding it as legally ineffec-
tive, a declaratory judgment may reflect that conclusion.  The court might 
declare, for example, that an invalid regulation imposes no duty on a pri-
vate plaintiff and gives the government no correlative right to compli-
ance.32  A declaratory judgment can rest on the conclusion that an agency 
regulation is invalid, but it cannot bring that invalidity about, because it 
declares and does not alter legal relations. 
                                                   
29 S. REP. NO. 75-963, at 3 (1937) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) 
(Sutherland, J.) (ellipsis not in the committee report)). 
30 Id.    
31 See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018). 
32 Declaratory judgments “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration” in a “case of actual controversy” within the issuing court’s jurisdiction.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2018).  Invalidity is not itself the legal relation of a party.  The relation of a 
private party subject to an invalid regulation that purports to govern the party’s conduct is privi-
lege or liberty, correlated with a no-right on the part of the government. 
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Several other forms of proceeding in which judicial review takes 
place do involve affirmative remedies that change legal relations, but not 
a remedy that purports to change the legal status of the agency action at 
issue. When judicial review enables a habeas petitioner to prevail, the 
court directs the defendant to release the petitioner, but issues no other 
order.  When a private plaintiff seeks and obtains an injunction against 
the institution of enforcement proceedings, the injunction is directed to 
the enforcement official.  It does not operate the way a judgment of re-
versal operates on the judgment below. 
Section 706 applies in all the forms of proceeding contemplated by 
section 703.  Its directive to set aside agency action must thus be such that 
a court can comply with it in any form of proceeding.  A court in an en-
forcement proceeding, in a declaratory proceeding, in habeas, or in a suit 
for an injunction against enforcement proceedings, cannot comply with a 
directive to issue an appellate-type order purporting to undo what the 
agency has done.  In all those proceedings, and in all proceedings covered 
by section 703, the court can comply with a directive not to decide in ac-
cordance with the agency action.33 
Section 706 does not call for any remedy, universal or limited.34 
 B.  If Section 706 Directs Courts to Give a Remedy, It Does Not Call 
for Universal  Injunctions  
Suppose the foregoing argument is wrong, and section 706 does di-
rect courts to give a remedy that sets aside agency action the way an ap-
pellate court sets aside a lower-court judgment.  If that were the correct 
reading of section 706, it would not call for universal injunctions like that 
issued in Trump v. Pennsylvania.  That case did not arise under a special 
review statute that creates an appellate-type proceeding.  It was a suit in 
district court with the agencies as defendants, in which the plaintiff 
sought an injunction against enforcement of a regulation.  Injunctions 
against enforcement are not like appellate judgments of reversal.  Rever-
sal by an appellate court changes the legal status of the lower court’s 
judgment.  An injunction against enforcement of a regulation rests on the 
                                                   
33 The slightly cumbersome formulation I use, that section 706 tells the court not to decide in 
accordance with the agency action, reflects the differences among proceedings for judicial re-
view.  In an enforcement proceeding, for example, not deciding according to the action means 
treating it as legally ineffective. Under an appellate-type special review statute, not deciding ac-
cording to the action means making it ineffective. 
34 The committee reports on the APA are consistent with this account of the scope of judicial 
review provision, and count against the reading according to which it directs that a remedy of 
setting aside be given.  Both reports, in discussing that part of the judicial review provision, par-
aphrase it by saying that the court is to hold the agency action unlawful, without including setting 
aside.  See S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 27 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 1980, at 44 (1946).  If the report 
drafters had thought that "set aside" added a directive about remedies, they likely would have 
included it.  If they thought that it confirmed that unlawful agency action was not to be imple-
mented, they had less reason to do so. 
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conclusion that the regulation is already invalid.  An anti-enforcement in-
junction cannot bring that invalidity about, because invalidity must be 
found before the injunction can issue.  Injunctions against enforcement 
cannot vacate rules, so if section 706 directs courts to vacate agency ac-
tion it does not instruct them to give anti-enforcement injunctions. 
Judges and others experienced in administrative law may miss this 
difficulty because they may not have in mind the differences among the 
forms of proceeding for judicial review.  Some of those forms of proceed-
ing do put the reviewing court in a position like that of an appellate tri-
bunal.  Some do not, and the form of proceeding in Trump v. Hawaii does 
not.35  
Section 706 does not call for universal remedies.   
 
 
                                                   
35 As noted above, supra note 19, the Third Circuit seems to have missed this point. 
